Political populism and clientelism are two distinct political strategies with significant conceptual overlaps. From a theoretical standpoint, political populism is associated with charismatic leaders who mobilise mass support through ideological and rhetorical appeals (Urbinati 2019). Clientelism, on the other hand, is a more transactional relationship, which aims to secure support from specific groups by providing material benefits and cultivating personal relationships through area-based networks (Berenschot and Aspinall 2022). Short-termism is a common attribute of both strategies. Populist and clientelist political actors tend to detest long-term planning and bypass institutional norms and practices (Bardhan 2022).
Building on the above theoretical framing, this essay uses the ongoing controversy over the future of the 150-year-old tram system of Kolkata (Calcutta) to argue that political populism and clientelism, while analytically distinct, often operate in a symbiotic relationship that thrives by circumventing institutional planning processes in urban governance. Urban planning in Kolkata is deeply entangled with the city’s populist political fabric, where formal institutions are routinely overshadowed by informal networks and clientelist arrangements. At the heart of this system are petty neighbourhood political operatives—who act as crucial intermediaries, mobilizing the urban poor as foot soldiers in broader populist projects and reinforcing a governance model that prioritizes short-term political gains over long-term urban sustainability.
Kolkata’s historic tram system (Photo 1) is now at the center of a heated debate between city authorities and environmental activists. The government wants to shut down most networks, preserving only a short section as a “heritage” route, as trams are considered “obsolete” and “slow,” and “lead to traffic congestion.” As a replacement, the authorities are keen to promote three-wheeler autorickshaws, which are part of the city’s informal economy, and procure new electric buses. Activists, however, argue that instead of being treated only as heritage, the tram systems need to be revived and modernized as a viable everyday mobility option, as the city is already grappling with severe road congestion and air pollution. Analysts also point out that battery-powered buses are [far less energy-intensive>www.thestatesman.com/opinion/kolkata-needs-trams-not-battery-run-buses-1503375349.html] compared to the trams and are more expensive to operate and maintain.
Source: Sushmita Chatterji.
As the authorities push ahead with dismantling Kolkata’s tram system, in haste and with little public consultation, activists under the banner of the Calcutta Tram Users’ Association (CTUA) and People United for Better Living in Calcutta (PUBLIC) are trying to put up resistance by organizing public awareness campaigns, holding street protests, and approaching the judiciary. In response to a public-interest litigation filed by PUBLIC, the Calcutta High Court, in an interim order in December 2023, asked the government to maintain the status quo regarding the tram operations and form an expert committee to explore opportunities to modernize and restore the tram services through public–private partnerships.
Growth and decline of the tram network
Kolkata is India’s third-largest urban agglomeration and the capital of the West Bengal state. The core city has a population of 4.5 million with a density of 24,860 inhabitants per square kilometer (64,390 per square mile) as per the 2011 census. It was the capital of British India until 1911, and tram lines began to be laid in the city from 1873 onwards. In the 1970s, the network reached its peak, with 52 routes spanning 70 kilometers (45 miles). The robust network and affordable rates increased popularity of the system among all sections of society and helped develop a transit-oriented culture in the city—one that has few parallels in India. In 1984, the city got India’s first metro rail system, which further augmented this transit culture.
However, from the 1990s, urban authorities in Kolkata began increasingly prioritizing vehicular traffic. This shift aligned with India’s economic liberalisation, which introduced market-driven policies to attract private capital and integrate cities into the global economy. The rise of a new middle class, shaped by liberalization and consumption-led aspirations, reinforced this trajectory, as private automobiles and two-wheelers became symbols of upward mobility. Consequently, for city authorities, constructing flyovers and roads became a dual strategy: supporting the growing dominance of private vehicles, while also projecting an image of progress and modernity attuned to middle-class aspirations. Researchers on transit politics have noted that in cities undergoing neoliberal transformation, urban transport policy is heavily shaped by the political economy of road building, which equates car ownership with economic growth (Mattioli, Roberts, Steinberger and Brown 2020). Kolkata’s transport policy broadly mirrored this trend.
Under these circumstances, trams began to be portrayed as “obsolete” relics, incompatible with the modernizing agenda and neoliberal urban vision. Their dedicated corridors were increasingly taken over to widen roads, and networks were disrupted by the construction of flyovers. Over time, tram decline became a self-perpetuating cycle of decay: governmental neglect and lack of investment led to poor service, reducing ridership, which then justified further route curtailments. As more routes were cut, trams became less viable and attractive, leading to even fewer passengers.
By 2011, the number of functional routes was down to 37. Since then, the rate of decline has further escalated, leaving just three routes in 2022. In 2011, Trinamool Congress (TMC), a centrist party, came to power (and is still in power now), defeating the Left Front government that was in power for the previous three decades. The rise of the TMC as a dominant political force in West Bengal marked a shift toward a personality-centric populist politics, centered around its charismatic leader, Mamata Banerjee (Ray Chaudhury 2022). She had long cultivated her image as a “protector of the urban poor”—by resisting forced evictions of street vendors when she was in opposition. After coming to power, TMC sought to strengthen its hold over the city’s informal economy through neighborhood-level patronage networks (Jha, Ghatak and Maiti 2022).
Consequently, the politics of urban informality have deeply influenced Kolkata’s governance processes, including transportation planning. One striking example is the city’s growing reliance on three-wheeler auto-rickshaws, which have proliferated under the tacit support of local party operatives. These vehicles, often operating without strict regulatory oversight, are favoured for their ability to generate quick livelihoods for unemployed youth—an important political constituency—while also reinforcing the TMC’s image as responsive to the needs of the urban poor.
On the other hand, bus and tram operations have declined. Between 2020 and 2024, the number of licensed private dropped by about 42%, as bus fares had not been revised since 2018—ostensibly to protect the interests of the poor. And the trams are suffering from chronic underinvestment. Between 2011 and 2017, annual investments in trams were cut from 55 million to 13 million rupees. And since 2018, that meager amount has come down to zero. Meanwhile, tram depots, which occupy large plots in prime locations, have become lucrative targets for commercial real-estate development. Eight depots remain, occupying 17.4 hectares (43 acres) of land, of which 2.4 hectares (6 acres) has already been leased out, fetching handsome returns. Land monetisation is a politically convenient way for state transport authorities to raise funds without raising passenger fares—and thus preserving their pro‑poor image.
Source: photo by author.
While trams are lying idle in depots (Photo 2), Kolkata is facing a rapid surge in the numbers of private automobiles and autorickshaws (Photo 3). Between 2019 and 2022, the number of private two-wheelers and four-wheelers jumped by 18.5%. While some tram users have shifted to private modes of transportation, anecdotal data suggests that most people are now taking autorickshaws, which, in Kolkata, run on shuttle routes and allow frequent stops. Between 2016 and 2022, the number of registered autorickshaws jumped from 40,740 to 46,320. In peripheral areas served by newly expanded metro services (funded through federal grants), autos have emerged as the primary mode of last-mile connectivity, given the absence of trams and infrequent bus services. Even long-distance commuters who once relied on trams or buses are increasingly compelled to use shuttle autos (requiring multiple transfers) owing to limited alternatives. This signals a fundamental shift in the city’s commuting pattern.
Source: Sushmita Chatterji.
Inefficiency in the trade-off, encouraging autorickshaws (and cars) at the expense of trams, is becoming evident. One double-compartment tram can comfortably carry 100 passengers, while an autorickshaw transports just four. It now takes about 25 to 35 autorickshaws to carry the same number of people who used to travel in a single tram. Not only do these three-wheelers take up more road space (Photo 4), but their chaotic road behaviour adds to traffic snarls. Autorickshaws also tend to use illegal fuels that generate emissions of noxious fumes. Kolkata is now one of the most polluted cities in India in terms of air pollution, and high vehicular emissions constitute the single most important factor. It is also one of the most congested.
Source: Sushmita Chatterji.
Populism over planning
The tram debate exposes how political expediency derails institutionalized planning practices and judicial processes. Considering that Kolkata has only about 6% of its land area available as road space, the Comprehensive Mobility Plan 2001–25, prepared by the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, emphasized expanding metro and tram networks. It was proposed that the daily passenger-carrying capacity of the tram system be increased from 0.2 million in 2001 to 1 million in 2025; however, the situation has moved in the opposite direction, with services on the verge of closure in 2025. In their hurry to dismantle the system, the authorities even started to pave unused tracks, despite a Calcutta High Court stay order (issued in December 2023), mandating the status quo on tram services—prompting a strong judicial rebuke and an order to “restore” the tracks in January 2025.
Reduction in tram operations helps the autorickshaws to gain more passengers. Autorickshaw unions are affiliated to political parties and wield significant political clout at the neighbourhood scale. The union leaders are petty political operatives, while the drivers act as foot soldiers during the elections. Comparatively, tram workers’ unions are far weaker owing to years of non-recruitment, and environmental groups are also small in number and rely upon the judiciary to take on the government.
This interplay between informality and political negotiation in Kolkata’s urban landscape is seldom based on ideological affiliations and instead exemplifies “survival politics” (Chatterjee 2004). Informal workers often engage in negotiated forms of political belonging, where access to basic services, space, and livelihoods is mediated through patronage networks and everyday bargaining with state institutions. Neighbourhood leaders, especially those from the ruling party, are key intermediaries in such transactional arrangements. While reinforcing clientelist ties, they also amplify the “protector of the poor” image of the top leaders among the benefactors.
The case of Kolkata’s tram system illustrates how, in practice, political populism and clientelism often operate in tandem, shaping urban infrastructure decisions through informal networks that bypass institutional governance arrangements. Local political intermediaries play a pivotal role in mobilizing urban poor, embedding them in patronage systems that ultimately reinforce the populist agenda. This dynamic undermines long-term, sustainable transport planning in favour of politically expedient choices. To address such challenges, it is essential to foreground the power dynamics, resource-allocation conflicts, and everyday political negotiations that drive infrastructure decisions in cities governed by populist-clientelist regimes.
Bibliography
- Bardhan, P. 2022. “Clientelism and governance”, World Development, no. 152: 105797.
- Berenschot, W. and Aspinall, E. 2022. “How clientelism varies: Comparing patronage democracies”, Varieties of Clientelism, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 1–19.
- Chatterjee, P. 2004. The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Jha, D., Ghatak, S. and Maiti, D. 2022. “Political stability in West Bengal: Prosperity or decay?”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 57, no. 25.
- Mattioli, G., Roberts, C., Steinberger, J. K. and Brown, A. 2020. “The political economy of car dependence: A systems-of-provision approach”, Energy Research & Social Science, no. 66, 101486.
- Ray Chaudhury, P. 2022. “The Political Asceticism of Mamata Banerjee: Female Populist Leadership in Contemporary India”, Politics & Gender, vol. 18, no. 4, pp. 942–977.
- Urbinati, N. 2019. “Political theory of populism”, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 22, no. 1: pp. 111–127.
