Settling on the Financial Periphery: Alternative Housing Practices in Hegang, China

Hegang, a city in Northeast China known for its coal industry, rose to prominence during China’s socialist era. It has faced economic stagnation, a population exodus, and plummeting housing prices over the past decade. This decline followed its designation as a “resource-exhausted city” by the central government in 2011. In 2019, housing prices in Hegang were the lowest among 320 cities at 2,285 yuan (approximately 317 USD) per square meter, in stark contrast to Beijing, which had the second highest prices at 63,000 yuan per square meter—over 27 times greater than Hegang (Securities Times Database 2020).

Despite this downturn, Hegang’s housing market saw a surprising rebound from 2019 to 2023. The sales area in 2023 reached 99,600 square meters, nearly triple that of 2019, which was 35,000 square meters (Hegang People’s Government Gazette, 2019; 2023). Concurrently, an increasing number of young migrants are choosing to settle in Hegang, contributing to the growth of the city’s emerging platform economy. [1]

This growth is particularly notable because it is not driven by state initiatives or real-estate capital, but rather by grassroots action. This essay argues that the “Hegang phenomenon” reflects a form of alternative housing practice, responding to the rising housing inequality in China. To fully understand this phenomenon, we must first examine Hegang within the broader context of the uneven geography of state-led financialization in post-2008 China.

Housing financialization in China: state-led scarcity and oversupply

China’s housing financialization post-2008 was largely a state project. In response to the post-financial crisis export slump, China promoted the collateralization of state-owned land [2] to facilitate real estate as a new arena for capital accumulation (Wu, F. 2023). A key policy tool introduced in 2012 was the nationwide Shantytown Redevelopment Schemes (SRSs). These schemes involved creating a housing scarcity by demolishing old residential areas and subsequently inflating the real-estate market by compensating displaced residents with money, encouraging them to purchase new homes (He et al. 2020; Wu 2023). Thus, housing, once a state welfare benefit during the socialist era, has transformed into an investment. The personal mortgage balance in China has surged dramatically, from 2.98 trillion yuan in 2008 to 44 trillion yuan in 2019. Climbing housing prices have also led to serious housing affordability problems (Wu et al. 2020).

However, these trends are primarily concentrated in the so-called “developed cities.” In many inland, resource-based cities like Hegang, SRSs opt for physical compensation rather than monetary compensation, meaning two to three new government-built units are directly given to displaced residents. This approach aims to prevent the outflow of monetary capital but has resulted in an oversupply of housing, significant drops in housing prices, and the bankruptcy of local real-estate developers (ThePaper 2019). In short, the assetization of housing was actually accompanied by the devaluation of housing in underdeveloped areas like Hegang.

Life experimentation in Hegang: home rather than financial assets!

“Hegang gives hope to us, the underclass who have no place to live” – Ren Kang

In November 2019, an article titled “Wandering to Hegang, I bought a home for 50,000 yuan” went viral on the internet, amassing over 400 million views to date. It recounts the story of a poor crew member who traveled to Hegang to buy an affordable home and settle there, sparking a migration wave to the city.

There are two primary characteristics of these new migrants who moved to Hegang after 2019. First, most are engaged in platform labor, a rapidly growing sector in China. The mobile nature of platform work makes them vulnerable within the dominant financial system. For instance, individuals without a fixed urban “hukou” [3] in China find it challenging to secure a mortgage from commercial banks, making it nearly impossible to purchase a home in major cities. Additionally, platform workers such as seafarers and drivers, who spend long periods away from home, not only continue to pay high rents for housing they seldom use but also face the constant threat of eviction. These drifting workers have long aspired for a stable home.

But the flexibility of platform labor also empowers them to strategically choose their living locations, freeing them from being tied to specific places. In Hegang, these new migrants leverage the internet to engage in online stores, delivery services, live broadcasts, and other digital jobs. They terminate their previous leases or sell their homes to settle debts, and then purchase homes in Hegang outright. As one young man planning his move to Hegang expressed, “I had to pay off my debt for 20 years to buy a home, but I didn’t realize it would only take one year in your place [Hegang]. Who is going to compensate me for these 19 years?” (China Youth Daily 2021). This shows that the existence of Hegang has prompted a reevaluation and rejection of the dominant temporal framework of the mortgage.

Second, real-estate data indicates that 60% to 70% of Hegang’s new residents are women (Chen 2022). Their families often hesitate to assist with mortgages and pressure them to marry early. Some divorced women seek homeownership in Hegang’s school district [4] to secure a stable, quality education for their children. As one female newcomer explained, “Instead of tiptoeing through life to please others, give yourself a true sense of belonging.” (ThePaper 2023). Owning a home in Hegang offers these women a chance to escape conventional social norms and start anew.

Regardless of their motivations, these new migrants in Hegang share a common goal: to achieve homeownership without relying on loans. For them, a home is not a financial asset but an alternative space that facilitates an escape from dominant debt relations, rental dependencies, and associated socio-cultural norms (Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage 2019). Hegang has become a testing ground for this experimental lifestyle.

The new real-estate agency: from financial to socio-cultural intermediary

The growing demand for homeownership in Hegang has led to an increase in the number of real-estate agents. Many of these agents, who were among the first newcomers to arrive in late 2019, are eager to share their experiences with a broader audience. Rather than promoting properties based on their future appreciation potential (exchange value), these new agents in Hegang recommend lower-priced yet livable homes (use value) for their clients, marketing these homes to their followers via online platforms. For these followers, real-estate agents provide not just commercial services, but also serve as pioneers and role models who embrace new life opportunities (Chen 2022).

Moreover, these agents do more than assist in home purchases; they also help newcomers integrate better into Hegang, a relatively unknown fifth-tier city in China. They introduce new residents to local employment opportunities, help southerners adjust to the local heating system, offer free guided tours, and even facilitate connections among divorced mothers (China Youth Daily 2021). Real-estate agents are actively building local social support networks around these new homes, with much of this work being voluntary.

Hegang, considered to have no investment value, is a typical “overlooked city” within China’s financialized housing system (Nugraha et al. 2023). One real-estate agent noted that some of the most frequently asked questions by clients include, “Is there take-out service in Hegang?” and “Do people fight a lot there?” These questions reflect the general public’s perception of Hegang as underdeveloped and unmodern. Therefore, led by real-estate agents, new migrants have begun to form online communities with names like “Wandering Bar," “Home for All,” “Home for the Wandering,” to proactively showcase Hegang’s parks, triple‑A hospitals, [5] and top-100 provincial high schools. Interestingly, these quality urban provisions originate from the welfare sector of state-run coal mining companies during the socialist era. This socialist legacy, combined with the alternative narrative of low housing prices and good living, has become a compelling counterpoint to today’s housing financial frontiers.

It can be argued that Hegang’s real-estate agents act not merely as financial intermediaries but as socio-cultural ones. Their commitment lies not in the assetization of housing but in fostering social solidarity on the financial periphery and revalorizing a depreciated city.

Hegang as a new discursive space: local policy responses and other Little Hegangs

Local governments actively engaged in this spontaneous migration movement from below, seizing the opportunity to promote Hegang as a “wanghong city.” [6] The term “wanghong urbanism” in China refers to a novel path of urban economic development, enabled by the rise of the platform economy (Cao 2024). Hegang, highly visible online and where new migrants predominantly engage in the platform economy, epitomizes this type of city.

In 2021, the Hegang municipal government first proposed the development of a “wanghong economy” as a new growth area in its annual work report (Hegang Municipal People’s Government 2021a). Subsequently, the Three-Year Action Plan for E‑Commerce Development in Hegang (2021–2023) was introduced, providing operational subsidies, tax incentives, rent reductions, financing support, and other forms of assistance to eligible start-ups in the platform economy (Hegang Municipal People’s Government 2021b). The Housing and Urban Renewal Bureau also collaborated with some newcomers who have a large following on platforms like TikTok to promote Hegang’s urban development (Southern Metropolis Daily 2022).

The new local policy discourse has begun to challenge the traditional real-estate-driven development path, declaring that “Hegang should not be a city based on real estate” (Wu, S. 2023). Simultaneously, it emphasizes the city’s grassroots dimension with the statement, “It’s no use for the government to say more; you don’t say it, let the people say and then say to each other!” (Southern Metropolis Daily 2022).

As Hegang became better known, more people started to engage in the search for the so-called “Little Hegangs”. Several inland cities with similarly low housing costs, such as Fuxin, Hebi, and Yumen, have also begun to receive increased online attention and in-person visits. Some individuals have even sought out often-overlooked, low-cost neighborhoods in developed coastal cities, promoting initiatives such as, “Guangzhou residents do not need to go to the Northeast; they have their own Hegang” (Outside the Fifth Ring 2024). In these broader grassroots actions, Hegang is no longer merely a geographic reference to a single city, but a collective, inter-city discursive practice centered on seeking affordable housing and alternative life imaginaries.

In other words, while the initial wave of migration to Hegang may have been a desperate move out of necessity, the subsequent new policy claims in Hegang and the emergence of more “Little Hegangs” reflect collective discursive strategies in the name of Hegang that consciously confronts the uneven geography of housing financialization and the crisis of affordability.

Hegang phenomenon: an alternative housing practice with political effects

The rise of Hegang is not a result of another wave of state-directed capital switching, nor is it driven by a pursuit of fashion and alternative identities by a small group of backpackers. The new migrants in Hegang are essentially “unwilling subjects” experiencing reluctance and struggle within the dominant financialized housing regime (Fields 2017). Moreover, subsequent policy responses do not stem from a top-down state mandate but rather from a coalition of local government, grassroots action, and collaborative imaginaries of alternative development amid uneven housing financialization. This spontaneous collaboration also reflects the tensions between multi-scalar state agendas, and the agency of local innovation in China’s urban development.

In particular, the case of Hegang exemplifies a form of collective behavior by non-collective consumer actors in China. It represents a type of social action that does not aim to make radical political statements but rather mobilizes collective pressures for recognition and resistance to housing inequality through everyday settlement, co-presence, and a shared sense of collective fate (Soaita 2024). The political effects of this alternative housing practice deserve more attention, especially in China’s state-led urbanism, where large-scale housing movements with clear political intentions are less common.

It is still important to recognize that the practice in Hegang does not address the root causes of the housing problem. The phenomenon of “Hegang Fever” will eventually lose its momentum. In light of the recent large-scale real-estate bailouts by the central government, it is evident that achieving housing equality and affordability will continue to be a significant challenge for Chinese society for the foreseeable future.

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